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ADVENTURES ON THE AUTOBAHN AND
INFOBAHN: UNITED STATES V. JONES,
MANDATORY DATA RETENTION, AND A
MORE REASONABLE “REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY”
John A. Stratford *
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 28, 2011, the House Judiciary Committee voted nineteen to
ten in favor of passing H.R. 1981, also known as the Protecting Children
from Internet Pornographers Act of 2011. 1 Among other provisions aimed
at stamping out child pornography on the Internet, one particular section of
the bill stirred up a maelstrom of controversy among privacy and civil
liberties advocates. The provision required every Internet service provider
(ISP) to retain, for a period of at least eighteen months, certain information
about every user of its service in order to allow law enforcement to access
records of suspected child pornographers. 2
Many of the same privacy advocates eagerly awaited last year’s
decision in United States v. Jones. 3 In Jones, the Supreme Court
considered whether extended warrantless GPS tracking of a vehicle by law
enforcement violates the Fourth Amendment. 4
These two hot-button issues both present concerns about privacy and
*

J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2013; B.A., University of California,
Santa Barbara, 2005. The author thanks Jessica Notebaert, the JCLC editorial staff, and
Professor Martha Kanter for invaluable insight and support.
1
Protecting Children from Internet Pornographers Act of 2011, H.R. 1981, 112th Cong.
§ 4; H.R. REP. NO. 112–281, pt. 1, at 22–29 (2011); see also Rainey Reitman, House
Committee Approves Bill Mandating that Internet Companies Spy on Their Users,
E LECTRONIC F RONTIER F OUND. (July 28, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2011/07/house-committee-approves-bill-mandating-internet. As of this writing, the bill
remains in the House of Representatives, scheduled on the Union Calendar.
2
H.R. 1981; see also Bipartisan Furor over Data Retention Bill Mars House Judiciary
Markup, WASH. INTERNET DAILY (July 28, 2011), available at 2011 WLNR 15187895; Greg
Nojeim, Data Retention Hearing: Opposition from Both Sides, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY &
TECH. (July 13, 2011), http://www.cdt.org/blogs/greg-nojeim/137data-retention-hearingopposition-both-sides.
3
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
4
Id.
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how courts should regulate interactions between individuals and the
government. In this Comment, I argue that these two controversies—one
involving surveillance of Internet users on the infobahn and one involving
surveillance of drivers on the autobahn—represent and illustrate the same
underlying problem with current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the
“assumption of risk” doctrine first articulated in Katz v. United States. 5 I
further contend that this doctrine is misguided and has become untenable in
modern society. Under a modified Katz test, setting aside the assumption of
risk doctrine, citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy both in user
data retained by ISPs and in the totality of the movements of their vehicles.
The modified Katz test proposed here renders both of these regimes
presumptively unconstitutional. Such a modified test would at the very
least begin the process of bringing the Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence back in line with the fundamental principles behind that
Amendment.
Part I briefly outlines the history of and controversy surrounding both
mandatory data retention and warrantless GPS tracking in the context of the
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part II articulates how these two
controversies can be understood as symptoms of the same problem: the
assumption of risk doctrine. It then explains why the current state of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence does not provide adequate safeguards for
individual privacy and presents the normative reasons supporting a change
in the doctrine. Finally, Part III offers a modified “reasonable expectation
of privacy” framework that excludes the assumption of risk doctrine. This
Part concludes that both mandatory data retention and warrantless GPS
tracking raise grave constitutional concerns under such a test. It then
addresses concerns about potential future applications of Katz under this
test.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND KATZ V. UNITED STATES

The Fourth Amendment provides a short and rather vague statement
that acts as almost the sole regulation of conduct between individual
citizens and law enforcement officers. It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

5

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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6

As one commentator notes, “An elaborate regulatory system rests upon
this one sentence.” 7 The Fourth Amendment regulates a myriad of state–
citizen interactions, from more traditional traffic stops, search and frisks,
and arrests, to high-tech investigatory actions like wiretaps, Internet
surveillance, and GPS vehicle tracking.
A recurring question of interpretation in this regulatory system is what
constitutes a “search” or “seizure” for purposes of the Amendment. If a
government action against an individual is not a search or seizure, then the
Fourth Amendment inquiry ends and there is no further question of whether
the action was reasonable or whether a warrant was required under the
Amendment. 8 Early Supreme Court decisions focused on whether or not
the government was interfering with property interests when deciding what
constituted a search. 9 The meaning of a search soon came to be limited to
physical intrusions, a doctrine that culminated in the Court’s Olmstead
decision in 1928. 10 In that case, the Court held that law enforcement
tapping an individual’s telephone was not a search because it did not
This decision was
involve a physical intrusion into the home. 11
immediately criticized for cutting against the normative principles behind
the Fourth Amendment. 12 Was tapping a phone really so unlike invading
6

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1516 (2010).
8
The Supreme Court “has created a presumption that a warrant is required, unless
infeasible, for a search to be reasonable.” United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th
Cir. 2007) (citing cases). But, as Solove points out, “[d]espite the Court’s pronouncement in
Katz in 1967 that there are only ‘a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions’ to the warrant requirement, in the decades following Katz, the Court has made
numerous exceptions.” Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy Protection, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1119 (2002).
9
See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“It is not the breaking of [a
man’s] doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essence of the offence;
but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and
private property.”).
10
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
11
Id. at 466.
12
Indeed, Justice Brandeis offered an eloquent dissent in Olmstead, which now looks
prophetic considering Katz’s refocusing of the Fourth Amendment on privacy concerns:
7

The protection guaranteed by the Amendments [the Fourth and Fifth] is much broader in scope
[than the protection of property]. The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government
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physical property? Could the government simply wait until technology
afforded them the means to monitor citizens wholesale while the Fourth
Amendment stood idly by?
Nevertheless, the Court limited Fourth Amendment “searches” to
physical intrusions until its landmark Katz decision in 1967. 13 In Katz, the
FBI attached a listening device to a phone booth in which the defendant was
having a conversation about illegal gambling. 14 They recorded the
conversation, having obtained no warrant to do so, and then used the
recording against him in court.15 Katz argued that his Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable searches was violated, and the Court agreed.16
Rejecting their previous doctrine of physical intrusion, the Court stated,
“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
The test for exactly what was
constitutionally protected.” 17
“constitutionally protected” is now considered embodied in Justice Harlan’s
oft-quoted concurrence in the case: “My understanding of the rule that has
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 18
As the doctrine now stands, then, a search for the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment is a government action that infringes a person’s
“reasonable expectation of privacy.” 19 The test has both subjective (an
individual’s actual expectation of privacy) and objective (whether society
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of
the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 478–79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
13
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14
Id. at 348.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 359.
17
Id. at 351.
18
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
19
This Comment assumes that Katz correctly held that privacy protection is the
appropriate and intended purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures. It is outside this Comment’s scope to discuss other potential
justifications, but some commentators argue that privacy should not be the Fourth
Amendment’s controlling interest. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the
Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016 (1995) (advocating for less focus on
privacy and more focus on police violence in criminal procedure); Scott E. Sundby,
“Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and
Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (1994) (arguing that the Court’s focus on privacy has
actually restricted individual rights).
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deems that expectation reasonable) components.20 Crucially relevant to this
Comment, however, is what may be seen as Katz’s exception to the general
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test: “What a person knowingly
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.” 21 In the following sections, I show how this part of Katz’s
holding and its rigid interpretation by the Court has birthed a series of
controversial rules surrounding searches and privacy, using mandatory data
retention and warrantless GPS tracking as current examples.
B. MANDATORY DATA RETENTION AND THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE

Times have changed since Katz was decided in 1967—it is no secret
that we now live in an age where Internet use has become ubiquitous and is
arguably a necessity for navigating life in modern society. 22 And while the
Internet offers unprecedented opportunities for communication, education,
business, and entertainment, it is also the greatest aggregator of personal
information in human history. 23 As users navigate the Internet, they leave
behind a massive trail of data, including e-mail communication, instant
messaging, website browsing data, commercial transaction records, and
even information about software, hardware, and geographic location.24
It is unsurprising that third parties are increasingly eager to access this
virtual treasure trove of personal information. Search engines like Google
use it to sell tailored advertising; 25 marketing firms use it to analyze trends
in commerce; 26 and, relevant to this Comment, law enforcement uses it to
track down criminal suspects.
In the United States today, most ISPs retain some data about each of
their users for a limited period of time. 27 This data might include browsing
20
Although the Court has generally considered whether a “reasonable person” would
have the subjective expectation of privacy, it is worth noting here that the reasonable person
presupposes an innocent person. For instance, the Court held in Rakas v. Illinois that the
Fourth Amendment would not protect a burglar’s subjective expectation of privacy in a
summer cabin he is attempting to rob. 439 U.S. 128, 143–44 n.12 (1978).
21
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
22
According to one source, there were over two billion Internet users worldwide as of
2011 and over 78% of North Americans were Internet users. INTERNET WORLD STATS,
http://www.internetworldstats.com (last visited May 20, 2013).
23
See Solove, supra note 8, at 1093; Gavin Skok, Establishing a Legitimate Expectation
of Privacy in Clickstream Data, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 62–70 (2000).
24
See Skok, supra note 23, at 64–65.
25
See Privacy Policy for Google Ads and Advertising Services, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/privacy/ads/privacy-policy.html (last updated July 27, 2012).
26
See Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2012, at SR1.
27
See Is It Legal?: Internet, NEWSLETTER ON INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM, Mar. 1, 2011, at
83.
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history, records of e-mail communication, and Internet protocol (IP)
addresses. 28 After a time, this information is often deleted. 29 Under current
data preservation laws, however, law enforcement officials may require
ISPs to retain certain data about specific customers suspected of crimes to
assist investigations. 30 The government can force ISPs to retain this data
for up to 180 days as part of its investigation. 31
H.R. 1981, introduced by Representative Lamar Smith of Texas,
would impose a much more severe regime of “mandatory data retention.” 32
Under a mandatory data retention program, ISPs (or other
telecommunications providers) are required to retain data about every user
for a specified period of time. In the case of H.R. 1981, ISPs would have to
retain temporarily assigned network addresses of all users for at least one
year. 33 Temporarily assigned network addresses are records of IP addresses
In combination with other
that the ISP assigns to customers. 34
“clickstream” data—like browsing history, commercial transaction records,
and communications—these IP addresses would allow law enforcement to
effectively identify customers and match them up with a comprehensive
record of online activity. 35
The bill was supported by the Department of Justice and the
International Association of Chiefs of Police.36 It was met with loud
opposition from privacy advocates in the media and within the House of
Representatives. The Center for Democracy & Technology, for example,
“urge[d] Congress to fully investigate questions about child pornography
28

An IP address is a unique number that identifies computers on the Internet. IP
Address, M ERRIAM -WEBSTER . COM , http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary//ip%20
address (last visited May 20, 2013).
29
See Is It Legal?: Internet, supra note 27.
30
See, e.g., Data Retention as a Tool for Investigating Internet Child Pornography and
Other Internet Crimes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland
Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 23–33 (2011) [hereinafter Data
Retention Hearing] (testimony of Kate Dean, Executive Director, United States Internet
Service Provider Association); Kristina Ringland, The European Union’s Data Retention
Directive and the United States’s Data Preservation Laws: Finding the Better Model, 5
SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 13 (2009), available at http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspacelaw/bitstream/handle/1773.1/427/vol5_no3_art13.pdf?sequence=1.
31
Data Retention Hearing, supra note 30, at 24 (testimony of Kate Dean).
32
H.R. 1981, 112th Cong. § 4 (2011).
33
Id.
34
For an explanation of how data retention works with respect to IP addresses and
temporarily assigned network addresses, see Mandatory Data Retention, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/mandatory-data-retention (last visited May 20,
2013).
35
Id.
36
See Is It Legal?: Internet, supra note 27, at 83.
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investigations before it consider[ed] imposing burdensome and costly
mandates on American industry that, in turn, harm the civil liberties of
American citizens.” 37 Failed data-retention bills introduced in the past have
met similar opposition. 38
Europe implemented a mandatory data-retention directive in 2006, 39
also in the face of great controversy, 40 and other countries have likewise
faced opposition in introducing data-retention laws. 41
While many opponents of mandatory data retention cite concerns of
cost and practicality, 42 privacy advocates are particularly worried that H.R.
1981 will be an irresistible temptation to law enforcement officials who
would have access to a vast amount of customer information without the
need for a search warrant. As of this writing, the Bill is still on the House
of Representatives’ Union Calendar.43
The data-retention discussion above begs the question: why wouldn’t
law enforcement officials need a warrant to access this type of online user
data? It might follow from a commonsense interpretation of a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” that data about Internet usage would be exactly the
kind of information that the Katz Court, in its rejection of physical
limitations on searches, wanted to protect from the prying eyes of the
government. But the issue that floats just beneath the surface of the
mandatory data-retention controversy is Katz’s holding that information
“knowingly expose[d]” to public view is not subject to Fourth Amendment
protection. In the context of customer data retained by ISPs, the
37
Data Retention Hearing, supra note 30, at 34–45 (testimony of John Morris, General
Counsel, Center for Democracy and Technology).
38
See Leslie Harris, Internet Safety Act Would Make Us Less Safe, ABC N EWS (Mar. 12,
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/AheadoftheCurve/story?id=7060343&page=1#.
UVWl5RyPMs5 (criticizing the Internet Safety Act of 2009, a similar data-retention bill).
39
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March
2006, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54–56, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:0063:EN:PDF.
40
See, e.g., “Monumentous Battle” Said Raging over Telecom Data Storage, COMM.
DAILY, Nov. 4, 2005; Warwick Ashford, EEF Calls for ISP Data Retention Law to Be
Scrapped, COMPUTER WKLY. (Oct. 26, 2010, 4:58 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/
news/1280094182/EEF-calls-for-ISP-data-retention-law-to-be-scrapped.
41
See, e.g., John Fotiadis, Cyber Crime: Big Brother Is Watching, BANGKOK POST (Aug.
15, 2008), http://www.tilleke.com/sites/default/files/cyber_crime.pdf (detailing new
mandatory data-retention laws in Thailand); Sean Parnell, Canberra Rethinks Retention
Regime
on
ISP
Subscriber
Records,
AUSTRALIAN
(July
26,
2011),
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/foi/canberra-rethinks-retention-regime-on-ispsubscriber-records/story-fn8r0e18-1226101609674 (discussing plans for an Australian dataretention regime).
42
See, e.g., Data Retention Hearing, supra note 30, at 23–33 (testimony of Kate Dean).
43
Protecting Children from Internet Pornographers Act of 2011, H.R. 1981, 112th Cong.
§ 4.
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government is allowed access via the third-party doctrine.
The third-party doctrine essentially holds that the Fourth Amendment
does not protect from government intrusion any information that an
individual willingly offers to a third party. 44
The doctrine finds its roots in pre-Katz cases dealing with government
informants. In Hoffa v. United States, for example, the Court held that the
defendant had no expectation of privacy in conversations with an associate
who later turned out to be a government informant.45 In a precursor to later
cases dealing with the assumption of risk doctrine, the Court reasoned that
the Fourth Amendment afforded no protection to “a wrongdoer’s misplaced
belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will
not reveal it.” 46
After Katz, the third-party doctrine was solidified in United States v.
White. 47 In White, the government relied on testimony from law
enforcement agents who used a radio transmitter to listen in on
conversations between the defendant and a government informant.48 White
argued that the government violated his Fourth Amendment rights and his
expectation of privacy in the conversation with the informant. Relying in
part on the pre-Katz cases involving government informants discussed
above, 49 the Court held that White had no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the conversation:
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his
companions may be reporting to the police. If he sufficiently doubts their
trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or never materialize. But if he
50
has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.

In essence, anything told to another, no matter what the subjective
expectation of privacy in that information, is not private enough to meet the
Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.
Five years after White, the Court significantly expanded the third-party
doctrine in United States v. Miller, a case more closely analogous to the
44

Many scholars discuss the evolution and meaning of the third-party doctrine in detail
that is beyond the scope of this Comment. See, e.g., Matthew Tokson, Automation and the
Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 596–600 (2011).
45
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03 (1966).
46
Id.; see also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment was not implicated by sending an undercover agent to the defendant’s house to
make a purchase of narcotics from the defendant); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
437–39 (1963) (holding that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated by an undercover
agent using a recording device to record a conversation with the defendant).
47
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
48
Id. at 746–47.
49
Id. at 749 (citing cases).
50
Id. at 752.
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issue of data retention by ISPs. 51 Faced with a society of individuals who
increasingly exposed more and more of their information to third parties via
new technology, and not just in personal conversations, the Court stuck
with the logic of the third-party doctrine. Miller involved the retention of
customer bank records and whether or not it was a Fourth Amendment
search for the government to access them. Relying on White to reject
Miller’s claim of Fourth Amendment protection of the records, the Court
held, “The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that
the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.” 52
Reaching back to the government-informer cases, the Court further
declared:
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a
third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
53
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.

Three years after Miller, the Court in Smith v. Maryland considered the
third-party doctrine in the context of a pen register device used by a
telephone company to record phone numbers dialed by the defendant.54 In
this third landmark case, the Court held that the defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed: “When
he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to
the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in
the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk
that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”55
The Court has kept the third-party doctrine alive in the face of
advancing technology and a society that increasingly exposes more and
more individual information to third parties. In White, the protected
information was disclosed via word of mouth; in Miller, via written records;
and in Smith, via numbers dialed on a home telephone.56 What about
information disclosed via the Internet? The answer is that although there is
51

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Id. at 443.
53
Id. (citing White, 401 U.S. at 751–52). There was already a suggestion of some
limitation on the third-party doctrine here, however: the Court also noted that “the checks
[were] not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial
transactions.” Id. at 442.
54
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979).
55
Id. at 744.
56
See also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–52 (1989) (holding no reasonable
expectation of privacy in a greenhouse with a missing window where a government plane
flew above it and discovered marijuana plants inside); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
35, 39–43 (1988) (holding no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage bags placed on
the defendant’s curb).
52
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a somewhat complex scheme of statutory protections in place for data
transmitted online, 57 law enforcement is still able to access a vast amount of
data held by ISPs without the need for a warrant.58 The controversy over
mandatory data retention is simply over which information ISPs must hold
and for how long.
C. WARRANTLESS GPS TRACKING

United States v. Jones represents one new frontier in a long-standing
battle over the constitutionality of electronic surveillance. 59 In Jones, the
defendants were suspected of possession and distribution of cocaine.
Government agents planted a GPS 60 tracking device on Jones’s vehicle and
tracked the location of the vehicle every ten seconds for a month. 61 They
did so without a warrant. 62 Using location data from the GPS along with
cell phone records, the government at trial was able to paint a
comprehensive and incriminating picture of Jones’s activity. The issue
before the Supreme Court was whether this extended warrantless
monitoring by GPS was a violation of Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights.
The Government argued that under the Court’s decision in United
States v. Knotts, the use of the GPS tracking device was not a “search” for
Fourth Amendment purposes because Jones had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the public movements of his vehicle.63
In Knotts, law enforcement agents in Minnesota attached an electronic
“beeper” tracking device to a drum of chloroform that they suspected was
going to be used by the defendant for manufacturing illegal drugs. 64 Once
the drum was placed in a vehicle, agents used the device to track the
vehicle’s movements to a cabin, which they then obtained a warrant to
57
For a thorough analysis of the statutory regime of protections regulating government
access to third-party records, see Solove, supra note 8, at 1138–51. Although there are
statutes regulating areas like wiretapping, access to stored communications, financial
records, and medical records, Solove concludes that it is inadequate to “fill the void created
by the judicial evisceration of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1150.
58
Id.; see also Catherine Crump, Data Retention: Privacy, Anonymity, and
Accountability Online, 56 STAN. L. REV. 191, 196 (2003).
59
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
60
The Global Positioning System is a network of U.S.-owned satellites used to pinpoint
locations on the surface of Earth. See GPS Overview, GPS.GOV, www.gps.gov/systems/gps
(last modified Jan. 17, 2013).
61
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
62
Id. (explaining that the police had actually obtained a warrant earlier in the
investigation, but installed the GPS device after the warrant had expired).
63
460 U.S. 276, 280–85 (1983).
64
Id. at 277.
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search. They used the evidence found therein to convict Knotts. The Court
ruled that there was no expectation of privacy in the movements of a
vehicle along public streets—this was essentially information that was
“knowingly exposed” to the public. And although Knotts argued that the
use of the electronic tracking device was different than a law enforcement
officer following him in person, the Court dismissed the beeper as only
being of “limited use” and noted that a police officer could have gleaned the
same information that the beeper had with the naked eye. 65
Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have relied on Knotts to hold that
using a GPS device to track and monitor an individual’s movements in his
vehicle over an extended period of time is not a Fourth Amendment search.
In United States v. Garcia, 66 police placed a GPS tracking device on the
defendant Garcia’s vehicle and used it to track him to a field where they
found evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing. Prosecutors used this
evidence to convict Garcia. Although the court expressed some concern
about the potential implications of a GPS surveillance regime on privacy
protection, 67 it held that use of the GPS device was not a Fourth
Amendment search. The court’s justification rested in part on the
observation that use of the GPS device was merely a substitute for good
old-fashioned police surveillance, which was “unequivocally not a search
within the meaning of the [Fourth A]mendment.” 68
In United States v. Pineda-Moreno, the named defendant was observed
purchasing supplies often used in growing marijuana. 69 Federal agents then
undertook an extensive investigation of Pineda-Moreno, installing GPS
tracking devices on his vehicle on seven different occasions.70 When the
GPS device alerted the agents that Pineda-Moreno was leaving a suspected
marijuana growing site, they followed his car, arrested him, and eventually
got consent to search his home and trailer, where they found marijuana.71
The Ninth Circuit, considering the question whether the use of the GPS
devices was a Fourth Amendment search, concluded that it was not: “The
only information the agents obtained from the tracking devices was a log of
65

Id. at 285. The Court also foresaw future difficulties in dealing with advancing
technology that might not constitute such a “limited use.” But in addressing the question of
whether a warrant would be required in a case involving prolonged, round-the-clock
surveillance, the Court declined to answer: “[I]f such dragnet-type law enforcement practices
as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.” Id. at 283–84.
66
474 F.3d 994, 995 (7th Cir. 2007).
67
See infra notes 90 and 102.
68
Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997.
69
591 F.3d 1212, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010).
70
Id. at 1213.
71
Id.

996

JOHN A. STRATFORD

[Vol. 103

the locations where Pineda-Moreno’s car traveled, information the agents
could have obtained by following the car.” 72 Relying on Garcia as
persuasive authority, the court reasoned that the use of the GPS device was
simply a substitute for an activity that was not a search—that is, in-person
surveillance by a police officer—and that this substitution did not
fundamentally change the fact that Pineda-Moreno’s movements were
exposed to the public. 73
However, the lower court decision in Jones, United States v. Maynard,
distinguished Knotts in holding that warrantless GPS tracking of the type
used in Jones was a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. 74 The
Maynard court invoked the mosaic theory, a central concept in intelligence
gathering more often applied in the national security context.75 The theory
holds that individual data points, while perhaps not revealing on their own,
can be highly revealing if aggregated and analyzed as a whole.76 In
applying the mosaic theory to GPS tracking, the Court reasoned that “[t]he
whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is not constructively
exposed to the public because, like a rap sheet, the whole reveals far more
than the individual movements it comprises . . . no single journey reveals
the habits and patterns that mark the distinction between a day in the life
and a way of life.” 77 Essentially, because GPS tracking revealed a more
intimate and detailed picture of Jones’s activities, the court found a
conceptual difference between this type of surveillance and the use of the
beeper in Knotts. 78
In the end, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones declined to
72

Id. at 1216.
Id.
74
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–56 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
75
For a discussion of the mosaic theory in general and its evolution in the context of the
Freedom of Information Act, see generally David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National
Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005).
76
Id.
77
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562. The Maynard court also noted that the Supreme Court
“implicitly recognized the distinction between the whole and the sum of the parts in the
Fourth Amendment case of Smith v. Maryland,” and “considered not just whether a
reasonable person expects any given number he dials to be exposed to the phone company
but also whether he expects all the numbers he dials to be compiled in a list.” Id.
78
See also People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009). In Weaver, the Court of
Appeals of New York similarly distinguished the use of a GPS tracking device from the
beeper in Knotts:
73

One need only consider what the police may learn, practically effortlessly, from planting a single
[GPS] device. The whole of a person’s progress through the world, into both public and private
spatial spheres, can be charted and recorded over lengthy periods possibly limited only by the
need to change the transmitting unit’s batteries.

Id. at 1199.
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frame the issue as one falling under Katz’s “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test. Instead, the Court held the GPS tracking was a Fourth
Amendment search because it was a trespass to place the tracking device on
Jones’s car—it did not hold that Jones had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the movements of his vehicle.79 Relying on a Boyd-like
conception of invasion of property rights as a Fourth Amendment search,
the Court noted that Katz was viable, but that a reasonable expectation of
privacy was not the sole criterion for defining a search.80
After the Court’s narrow holding in Jones, 81 privacy advocates
continue to argue that GPS technology, like mandatory data retention,
provides the government another “irresistible temptation” to undertake
unreasonably broad monitoring of individuals.82
III. DISCUSSION
A. THE “ASSUMPTION OF RISK” DOCTRINE

This Part argues that the controversies over mandatory data retention
and warrantless GPS tracking are symptoms of the same problem—the
assumption of risk doctrine implicit and often explicit in the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
The assumption of risk language stems from the Court’s consideration
of retaining bank records in the Miller case: “The depositor takes the risk,
in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by
that person to the Government.”83 But the central idea of the assumption of
risk doctrine is rooted in the language of Katz, nineteen years before: “What
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” 84
On its face, the language seems to echo the “plain view” doctrine used
by courts in the Fourth Amendment context. As Justice Harlan noted in his
concurrence in Katz, “[O]bjects, activities or statements that [an individual]
exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no
79

See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
Id. at 951.
81
See, e.g., Tom Goldstein, Why Jones Is Still Less of a Pro-Privacy Decision than Most
Thought, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 30, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/
why-jones-is-still-less-of-a-pro-privacy-decision-than-most-thought/.
82
See, e.g., Editorial, Is GPS Tracking Too ‘1984’?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at A22;
GPS Inventor Joins EFF in Fight Against Warrantless GPS Tracking, ELECTRONIC
F RONTIER F OUND. (Oct. 3, 2011), https://www.eff.org/press/archives/2011/10/03-0; Frank
Miniter, Is the Right to Privacy Dead?, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2011, 4:09 PM),
www.forbes.com/sites/frankminiter/2011/11/17/is-the-right-to-privacy-dead/.
83
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
84
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
80
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intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.” 85 If a police officer
pulls a vehicle over for a traffic stop and happens to see the passenger
carrying drugs through the window, it is not a violation of that passenger’s
Fourth Amendment rights for the officer to seize the drugs—the contraband
was there for anyone to see. Similarly, if a homeowner puts a sign on his
front lawn declaring himself a criminal, he has “knowingly exposed” this
information to the public and it violates no Fourth Amendment right for the
government to use that information against him under the plain view
doctrine.
As discussed above, the Court has applied this rationale repeatedly,
holding in various contexts that any information disclosed to a third party is
no longer “private” and thus is no longer protected by the Fourth
Amendment—no matter what actual, subjective expectation of privacy the
defendant held. In White and the government-informer cases, defendants
gave information by word of mouth to another. In Miller, the defendant
entrusted the bank with checks and deposit slips. In Smith, the defendant
exposed the phone numbers he dialed to the phone company. But did any
of these individuals actually expect that they had no privacy interest in their
respective information that was “knowingly exposed” to outsiders?
Common sense seems to dictate that Mr. Miller should reasonably expect
some modicum of privacy in the records kept by his bank, or that Mr. Smith
would be allowed some reasonable amount of surprise to find out that every
phone number he dialed would be exposed to the government. 86
The same rationale applies in the line of GPS tracking cases. In
Knotts, the defendant “knowingly exposed” the movements of his vehicle to
the public and thus, the inquiry was over—he could have no “reasonable
expectation of privacy” against the tracking of his vehicle by the
government. Following Knotts, the courts in Garcia and Pineda-Moreno
used the same rationale to allow extensive warrantless GPS tracking of the
defendants’ vehicles, no matter what the actual expectation of privacy was
on the part of Garcia or Pineda-Moreno. If one were to ask Mr. Garcia
himself, or a reasonable cross section of society, 87 whether or not they
would expect the government to be tracking their vehicles’ every move for
days or weeks at a time, it seems difficult to argue that they would answer
in the affirmative. 88
85

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See infra text accompanying notes 125–135 for empirical studies on subjective
expectations of privacy.
87
The author here notes the obvious difficulty of defining such a group, but the argument
remains the same—a “commonsense” understanding would be another way to phrase it.
88
See infra text accompanying notes 131–133; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945, 964 (2012) (“[S]ociety’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others
86
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One only has to look at the public outcry over mandatory data
retention and warrantless GPS tracking to see that the assumption of risk
doctrine has birthed controversial results in these two areas.89
In fact, mandatory data retention can be characterized as the logical
extension of the assumption of risk doctrine, which allows warrantless GPS
tracking. In both controversies, the assumption of risk doctrine allows the
government to access data that has been “voluntarily exposed” by
individuals: in one case, Internet usage data exposed to an ISP, and in the
other, physical location data exposed to the general public. With respect to
the Internet, the court-imposed regime is already far along the path of total
surveillance; it has decided that information exposed to ISPs is no longer
private. The data-retention controversy is about how much of that data law
enforcement agencies will be able to access and the extent to which private
companies must assist in that effort. GPS tracking might not be far behind.
Judge Posner opined in Garcia:
One can imagine the police affixing GPS tracking devices to thousands of cars at
random, recovering the devices, and using digital search techniques to identify
suspicious driving patterns. One can even imagine a law requiring all new cars to
come equipped with the device so that the government can keep track of all vehicular
movement in the United States. It would be premature to rule that such a program of
mass surveillance could not possibly raise a question under the Fourth Amendment—
that it could not be a search because it would merely be an efficient alternative to
90
hiring another 10 million police officers to tail every vehicle on the nation’s roads.

Of course, this strikes a familiar chord with those concerned about
mandatory retention of Internet data by ISPs. They fear that the
government could similarly use the vast treasure trove of customer data in
the Internet context to keep track of all movement in the United States, not
along the physical highway, but along the information highway. Another
commentator explicitly considers this connection between autobahn and
infobahn:
Hypothetically, if the police used a device to track where one travels in cyberspace,
there is no reason to think that the use of such technology would constitute a search
under the Fourth Amendment. When one travels along the digital highway, such
movements are knowingly exposed to the public and merit no Fourth Amendment
protection. The digital web where a user journeys would be considered the functional
equivalent of the public streets. A cyber-beeper or pen register would seem to
91
comport with the Court’s analysis in Smith and Knotts.
would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue
every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”) (Alito, J., concurring
in the judgment).
89
See supra note 2.
90
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007).
91
Brian I. Simon, The Tangled Web We Weave: The Internet and Standing Under the
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Posner contemplates a regime of wholesale data gathering in the context of
GPS tracking. Is mandatory data retention of GPS location data the next
step in the Jones saga?
Whatever the future may hold, the Court’s current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence assumes that any information that is not kept completely
secret is up for grabs. 92 I now put forward the reasons why this trend is a
pernicious one.
B. NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CHANGES IN FOURTH
AMENDMENT DOCTRINE

There are many reasons to fear government surveillance programs
allowed by the Court’s modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Some
critics are reminded of Nineteen Eighty-Four and Orwell’s vision of
totalitarian oversight; 93 others are concerned with more creeping
conceptions of bureaucratic encroachment on civil liberties.94
In the context of warrantless GPS tracking and mandatory data
retention, this Comment proposes that the normative justifications for
changing Fourth Amendment doctrine fall into two central categories:
particularity and necessity. By particularity, I mean that the Fourth
Amendment intends to protect citizens from overly broad government
intrusion—that it seeks to make intrusions into private life as narrow and
particular as possible. Necessity refers to the idea that disclosure of
personal data has become an almost inevitable requirement for participation
in modern society.
1. Particularity
The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures was largely a response to the English colonial practice of
issuing writs of assistance. 95 Arising from the tradition of so-called general
warrants issued in England, 96 these writs were used by English customs
Fourth Amendment, 21 NOVA L. REV. 941, 967 (1997).
92
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[W]hatever the societal
expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that
all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is,
for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”).
93
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
94
See Solove, supra note 8, at 1101–14.
95
See generally Louis Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment, 21 GA. L. REV. 107
(1986).
96
For a history of the Fourth Amendment and its colonial roots, see NELSON B. LASSON,
THE HISTORY AND D EVELOPMENT OF THE F OURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED S TATES
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officers as justification for indiscriminate searches for smuggled goods. 97
Future colonial revolutionaries like John Adams spoke out against the writs
of assistance as infringing on their rights as individuals. 98 Patrick Henry
himself declared, “They may, unless the general government be restrained
by a bill of rights, or some similar restrictions, go into your cellars and
rooms, and search, ransack, and measure, everything you eat, drink, and
wear. They ought to be restrained within proper bounds.” 99
Early state constitutions adopted safeguards against such arbitrary
searches and seizures. 100 Eventually, these safeguards became federal law
in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. Specifically, the language
“and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized” was an explicit prohibition on the issuing of
writs of assistance or general warrants.
That the Framers wanted to prevent overly broad or arbitrary
government intrusion into individual life is clear. For the purposes of this
argument, I will refer to that general principle as the principle of
particularity. Behind this principle is the assumption that overbroad
searches of private citizens are inherently prone to abuse and arbitrary
action by government officials. Indeed, the general writs of assistance were
decried by colonial revolutionaries as “the worst instrument of arbitrary
power . . . [because they placed] the liberty of every man in the hands of
every petty officer.” 101 If the power to search is too broad, and if every
person and every piece of data is searchable, the discretion of law
enforcement officers becomes too powerful. Only by being particular in
the description of people and places to be searched can law enforcement
officers be restrained from exercising arbitrary discretion and using the
search power to fulfill personal vendettas or perpetrate other abuses. This is
what the Fourth Amendment ensures.
Yet while the Fourth Amendment is the central basis for the system
that regulates conduct between individuals and the government, its doctrine
CONSTITUTION (1937). Lasson notes that “[t]hese writs, which received their name from the
fact that they commanded all officers and subjects of the Crown to assist in their execution,
were even more arbitrary in their nature and more open to abuse than the general
warrants . . . .” Id. at 53–54 (internal citations omitted).
97
Fisher, supra note 95, at 108–109.
98
Id. at 109.
99
Solove, supra note 8, at 1125.
100
Fisher, supra note 95, at 110.
101
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 301–03 (1st ed.
1868)).
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has stood essentially unchanged as technology advances and offers the
government more broadly invasive and effective tools for individual
surveillance. As Chief Justice Warren remarked in Lopez:
[T]he fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication constitute a great
danger to the privacy of the individual . . . indiscriminate use of such devices in law
enforcement raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments . . . and these considerations impose a heavier responsibility on this
102
Court in its supervision of the fairness of procedures in the federal court system.

It is this Comment’s contention that the Court has not lived up to the
responsibility with which Warren felt it was entrusted.
New technology may encroach on the fundamental principle of
particularity in two ways. The first is by allowing surveillance of an
overbroad number of individuals at once. The second is by allowing the
government to gather an overbroad type of information about the
individuals it surveys.
The controversies over mandatory data retention and warrantless GPS
tracking are just two current examples of how technological advances
implicate these two types of violations of particularity.
i.

Overbroad Types of Information

With respect to Internet data, an Internet user whose online activities
are tracked is not the same as a bank user whose deposit slips are searched
or a telephone user whose dialed numbers are recorded. 103 Activity on the
Internet can be, and usually is, much more comprehensive and revealing
than banking or dialing phone numbers 104 (which, it may be added, may
both now be done online as well), meaning that law enforcement observers
may have access to much irrelevant and perhaps personal data. Internet
users may undertake a range of private activities online that are unrelated to
a law enforcement interest: e-mailing friends and family, checking medical
records, e-mailing doctors, participating in political discussion, or exploring
sexual proclivities. Accessing customer data from an ISP is not akin to
searching a car or a house for drugs or evidence of a specific crime. It is
more analogous to following someone, within the home and without,
listening in on that person’s conversations, reviewing a list of books
checked out and purchases made, and, in sum, obtaining a complete picture
102

Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963).
See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976). The Greenwood case is another example of a search discovering overly
broad types of information, as Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent: “A single bag of trash
testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and recreational habits of the person who produced
it.” California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 50 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104
See Tokson, supra note 44, at 602–04.
103
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of that person’s life. This is the quintessential violation of particularity
against which the Framers wanted to protect when they declared that only
those warrants could issue that were “particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
The relatively new technology of GPS tracking devices as used on
vehicles also implicates particularity in terms of overbroad types of
information. As the New York Court of Appeals pointed out in Weaver,
using a GPS device to track the totality of a vehicle’s movements over an
extended period of time reveals much more information than does
following that person in a car for one discrete trip. 105 Similarly, in
Maynard, the D.C. Circuit found that the defendant did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in individual trips taken in public, but did
have such a reasonable expectation in the totality of his movements, as
documented by the GPS device over a month-long period. 106
When law enforcement attaches a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle, it
is true that they might find evidence that the vehicle made stops at
suspicious locations, as was the case in Pineda-Moreno. But there is
nothing in the technology or current Fourth Amendment doctrine that
prevents law enforcement from seeing every innocent movement the
vehicle makes, as well. This is one of the ironies of the technological
erosion of Fourth Amendment privacy protections: that new technologies
are advanced enough to provide law enforcement with a way to get the
information they need, but not yet advanced enough to self-regulate and
exclude all of the private and probably irrelevant data that they do not need.
These types of technologies inherently carry the potential to violate the
particularity principle by giving law enforcement access to an overbroad set
of data.
ii. Overbroad Numbers of Individuals
The outcry over mandatory data-retention laws is largely a response to
a violation of particularity in terms of the number of individuals who are
surveilled. As an attorney for the Electronic Frontier Foundation warned
about H.R. 1981, “[t]he data retention mandate in this bill would treat every
Internet user like a criminal and threaten the online privacy and free speech

105

See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009).
See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“It is one thing for
a passerby to observe or even to follow someone during a single journey as he goes to the
market or returns home from work. It is another thing entirely for that stranger to pick up
the scent again the next day and the day after that, week in and week out, dogging his prey
until he has identified all the places, people, amusements, and chores that make up that
person’s hitherto private routine.”).
106
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rights of every American.” 107 The technological ability and capacity of
ISPs to retain data on every customer now allows a data-retention regime
that collects in its net not only those suspected of crimes, but also every
person who uses that provider’s service. This is in stark contrast to the
current regime in the United States, discussed above, which provides for
data retention only for those customers who are already the subject of a law
enforcement investigation. One does not need a very active mind to
imagine widespread government searches of a database of innocent user
activity that would root out patterns of “suspicious” Internet use.
And although GPS tracking technology does not implicate this type of
particularity quite as explicitly, there is still the potential for the same kind
of overbroad searching allowed by data retention. A GPS device does not
know who drives a vehicle—it only tracks the vehicle itself. Potentially,
then, a GPS device like the one used in Jones will track not only the
Joneses of the world, but also anyone who associates with the Joneses and
rides in or uses that vehicle: girlfriends of the Joneses, brothers of the
Joneses, and the children of the Joneses.
These were the kinds of overbroad searches that Madison and the
Framers sought to curtail in drafting the Fourth Amendment; much like the
hated writs of assistance, they encompass either too many individuals, or
too many types of information, or both.
Judge Posner remarked in Garcia:
Technological progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an extent of surveillance
that in earlier times would have been prohibitively expensive. Whether and what kind
of restrictions should, in the name of the Constitution, be placed on such surveillance
when used in routine criminal enforcement are momentous issues that fortunately we
108
need not try to resolve in this case.

This Comment contends that the time is ripe for these “momentous issues”
to be decided and that these violations of the fundamental constitutional
concept of particularity are grave enough to warrant a change in the
doctrine.
2. Necessity in the Internet Age
The other essential justification for a change in current Fourth
Amendment doctrine with respect to new technology falls into the category
of what I refer to here as necessity—i.e., that it is becoming increasingly
difficult to function in modern society without exposing personal
information to others.
The assumption of risk doctrine itself rests on an assumption that the
107
108

Reitman, supra note 1.
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (2007).
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giving up of information by an individual is undertaken voluntarily. In this
Part, I argue that as new technologies with potential for widespread
surveillance have become more prevalent in modern society, it has become
increasingly impractical or even impossible to live one’s life adhering to
more traditional standards of privacy.
The Internet is not a fad. While it might not be discussed in the same
breath as human necessities like food, water, and shelter, it may not be far
behind. In the United States, individuals are increasingly conducting
business online, communicating online, and entertaining themselves online.
According to a Nielsen study in 2010, 55% of American adults use the
Internet every day. 109 Forty-five percent of American adults use it to
communicate every day; 30% use it to get news every day; and 18% use it
to bank online every day. 110 New, unconventional uses are arising all the
time. Interactive video games like World of Warcraft, social networking
giants like Facebook and Twitter, and discussion forums of infinite varieties
attract millions of active users worldwide.
The importance of the Internet does not simply follow from the fact of
its widespread use, but it is increasingly being recognized as an
indispensable part of the modern experience. In a recent report, the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, recognized the
importance of the Internet. According to La Rue, the Internet is
fundamental for the basic human need to give and receive information, to
organize, and to express opinions:
Given that the Internet has become an indispensable tool for realizing a range of
human rights, combating inequality, and accelerating development and human
progress, ensuring universal access to the Internet should be a priority for all
111
States.

A private study commissioned by Internet giant Cisco in 2011 found that
one-third of college students questioned in fourteen different countries
agreed that the Internet was as important to them as water, food, air, and
shelter. 112
109
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Time
Online,
VISUALECONOMICS,
http://visualeconomics.creditloan.com/how-the-world-spends-its-time-online_2010-06-16/
(last visited May 20, 2013).
110
Id.
111
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, 17th Sess. on the Promotion and Prot. of All Human Rights, Civil
Political, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development,
Human Rights Council, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) (by Frank La Rue).
112
CISCO, 2011 CISCO CONNECTED WORLD TECHNOLOGY REPORT (2011), available at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns1120/2011-CCWTRChapter-3-All-Finding.pdf.
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Is it realistic to ask citizens to make the choice between using the
Internet and keeping a private life? More importantly, is it right to ask
individuals to make that choice? From a standpoint of protecting civil
liberties, the answer to these questions must be “no”—but nevertheless it is
what the courts require of our citizens today. 113
We might go further and consider whether we should ask citizens to
choose between driving cars and protecting the privacy of their movements
over extended periods of time. The potential chilling effect such a choice
would have on our constitutionally protected fundamental freedom of
movement is obvious.
Consider the future implications: what about an advanced device that
combined facial recognition technology with an aggregation of closed
circuit commercial video feeds to track individual human movement
throughout the day? 114 In deciding that such a regime would not violate a
person’s Fourth Amendment rights because they had knowingly exposed
their public movements to the world, the Court might very well ignore the
dilemma facing individuals who had a choice between total government
surveillance and never leaving home.
As Justice Warren warned, in a regulatory system based on the vague
and simple language of the Fourth Amendment, much of the responsibility
for drawing the line in interactions between the citizen and the state falls on
the Court. 115 Yet the Court has largely failed to update its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence since Katz. Solove declares the Court’s more
recent Fourth Amendment cases to be the harbingers of a “new Olmstead,
one that is just as shortsighted and rigid in approach.”116 The Court in
Olmstead took a narrow formalistic approach to privacy in holding that only
physical intrusions were government searches. The Court in Smith, Miller,
and its other assumption of risk cases adopted a similarly severe approach
in holding that any information that is “knowingly exposed” cannot be the
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. 117 In sum, modern technology
113

See supra Part II.A.
One study conducted in London concluded that the city was home to over 500,000
closed-circuit television surveillance cameras—one camera for every fourteen people in the
city. Michael McCahill & Clive Norris, CCTV in London (Ctr. for Criminology & Crim.
Just., Working Paper No. 6, 2002), available at http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp6.pdf.
115
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963).
116
Solove, supra note 8, at 1133.
117
The Court made some attempt to rectify this in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27
(2001). In that case, federal agents suspected that Kyllo was growing marijuana inside his
suburban home. They used a thermal-imaging device to scan the outside of his home to
determine whether the amount of heat emanating from it was consistent with the use of
certain types of lamps used in the manufacture of marijuana. The scan showed that the heat
emanating from particular areas of Kyllo’s home was hotter than the rest of the home, and
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has effected a fundamental change in society whereby individuals find
disclosure of personal information inevitable to a certain degree. The Court
should update Fourth Amendment doctrine to reflect this change.
Even if it were not necessary, or even important, to engage with
modern technology and expose information about oneself, the Court’s
conception of “privacy” expectations is flawed. In the Court’s current
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, privacy is an all-or-nothing game: either
there is an expectation of total privacy, or there is no expectation of privacy
at all. For example, when an individual has trash in his kitchen trash can,
that refuse is private, but as soon as the trash is given to the garbage
collector, it is fair game for all.118 Consider bank records: once they are in
the hands of a bank, there is no longer any expectation of privacy in those
records, at least with respect to the government. 119 Is this a valid place to
draw the line? It seems that most people who have their trash rifled through
on the curb or their bank records exposed to the public would feel that their
privacy had been violated to some degree. 120 Judge Kozinski put it
succinctly in his Pineda-Moreno dissent:
[T]here are many parts of a person’s property that are accessible to strangers for
limited purposes: the mailman is entitled to open the gate and deposit mail in the front
door slot; the gas man may come into the yard, go into the basement or look under the
house to read the meter; the gardener goes all over the property, climbs trees, opens
sheds, turns on the sprinkler and taps into the electrical outlets . . . . This doesn’t
mean that we invite neighbors to use the pool, strangers to camp out on the lawn or
121
police to snoop in the garage.

Essentially, there is no gray area in current Fourth Amendment
doctrine. As soon as privacy is given up with respect to one other person,
privacy no longer exists with respect to anyone. As Justice Sotomayor
pointed out in her concurrence in Jones, “[t]his approach is ill suited to the
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.” 122
substantially hotter than neighboring homes. Based in part on this evidence, agents secured
a warrant and convicted Kyllo. Id. at 29–30. In holding that the use of the thermal-imaging
device was a Fourth Amendment search, the Court noted that the device was so
technologically new that it was not in public use and thus that Kyllo could not have expected
that such a device would invade his privacy. Id. at 40. This case only went so far,
however—the fact that it was the interior of Kyllo’s home seemed to play an important part
in the Court’s decision. Id. at 34.
118
See generally California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
119
See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
120
See infra text accompanying notes 125–135.
121
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
122
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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While the Court declined to address these issues in Jones, it is likely only a
matter of time before they present themselves again. This Part shows that
these are fundamental problems that demand a change in Fourth
Amendment doctrine.
IV. A MODIFIED “REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY”
In this Part, I present a revised standard of a “reasonable expectation of
privacy” that excludes Katz’s “knowingly exposed” assumption of risk
exception.
Part II of this Comment attempted to show that the assumption of risk
doctrine gives us unreasonable and backward results in applying the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test. I now propose that the Court should
adopt a more flexible approach to the Katz test by eliminating the rigid per
se rule that any information divulged or “knowingly exposed” in any way is
no longer private. The remaining part of Katz, Justice Harlan’s now famous
two-prong inquiry into whether there was an expectation of privacy and
whether that expectation was reasonable,123 would form the new, modified
Katz test.
Much as Katz attempted to bring more flexibility to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence as a response to controversial cases like
Olmstead, this modified “reasonable expectation of privacy” test should
allow courts to accept the commonsense notion that privacy is not an all-ornothing principle. Some commentators argue as a whole that Katz cannot
be saved. 124 Although the privacy issues discussed in this Comment do
bring the whole structure of Katz into question, I contend that in the context
of access to Internet user data and warrantless GPS tracking, Katz remains a
viable guide if modified correctly. In these cases, the Katz test should be
limited to the two-step inquiry put forward by Justice Harlan, which has the
benefit of a detailed jurisprudential history immediately familiar to courts.
The “knowingly exposed” exception to that test, which led to the third-party
doctrine and warrantless GPS tracking, should be relegated to the dustbin of
Fourth Amendment history.
A. APPLICATION TO MANDATORY DATA RETENTION AND
WARRANTLESS GPS TRACKING

How would such a modified Katz test treat the two controversies
considered in this Comment? Absent the “knowingly exposed” assumption
of risk exception, the Court would look first to whether there was an actual,
subjective expectation of privacy and then to whether society was prepared
123
124

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Skok, supra note 23, at 82.

2013]

ADVENTURES ON THE AUTOBAHN AND INFOBAHN

1009

to deem that expectation a reasonable one.
Is it reasonable to expect that telling something to a friend, or handing
over records to a bank, exposes that information to government agents?
Commonsense expectations aside, empirical studies suggest that, for most,
the answer is no. 125 The authors of one study asked individuals to rank
various investigative police actions on a scale of how intrusive they felt the
actions to be. Some of the survey results showed that actual expectations of
privacy generally mapped onto the Court’s conception of those
expectations. For example, searching a bedroom and bugging a phone were
both seen by survey respondents as highly intrusive searches, views which
the Court’s cases would corroborate. 126
Other results, however, showed a significant disparity in what the
Court considers intrusive and what reasonable people consider intrusive.
The use of undercover agents, repeatedly held by the Court not to implicate
the Fourth Amendment under the assumption of risk doctrine, 127 was seen
by survey respondents as very intrusive. 128 Perusing bank records, held not
to be a Fourth Amendment search under the third-party doctrine in
Miller, 129 was similarly seen by respondents as a highly intrusive search. 130
While “using a beeper to track car” was somewhat lower on the
intrusiveness rankings, 131 this survey was conducted in the early 1990s and
the question was presumably based on the facts of Knotts. We might
imagine what the result would have been if the question were changed to
“using a GPS device to track every movement of car for a month.” In fact,
in a more recent survey conducted by Zachary Gray of UC Hastings, Gray
explicitly considered society’s expectations of privacy related to more
modern GPS vehicle tracking as in Jones. 132 His conclusion was that
“[s]ociety overwhelmingly believes that GPS tracking is unjustifiable and
violates an individual’s privacy rights.” 133
The results of these surveys show that under the modified Katz test
proposed here, the Court would at the very least be forced to find a serious
125
See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 739 (1993).
126
Id.
127
See supra Part I.
128
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 125, at 740.
129
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441–43 (1976).
130
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 125, at 740.
131
Id. at 737–38.
132
Zachary Gray, Note, Herding Katz: GPS Tracking and Society’s Expectations of
Privacy in the 21st Century, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 145, 147–48 (2012).
133
Id. at 166.
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constitutional problem with those regimes. 134 Such a test would set courts
free to follow the logic of the D.C. Circuit in Maynard: “In considering
whether something is ‘exposed’ to the public as that term was used in Katz
we ask not what another person can physically and may lawfully do but
rather what a reasonable person expects another might actually do.” 135
This section has attempted to show that a modified Katz test rejecting
the assumption of risk exception would find serious constitutional problems
with both mandatory data retention and warrantless GPS tracking. In the
next section, I will address the main counterarguments against this proposed
test.
B. FUTURE APPLICATIONS AND CONCERNS

There are viable concerns with this modified Katz test. One is the
difficulty it might pose for law enforcement, both in terms of requiring
complicated decisions by police officers and in hindering efficient
searching. A more important concern from the privacy advocate’s
perspective is that, like current Katz jurisprudence, it leaves open the
possibility of future erosion of privacy by advancing technology. I address
these arguments in turn.
1. Law Enforcement Concerns
One criticism of this modified Katz test, and indeed of any change to
current doctrine that allows for greater privacy protection under the Fourth
Amendment, is that it will increase the cost of effective law enforcement
and may allow some criminals to go free. 136 Since more law enforcement
actions will now be considered searches for Fourth Amendment purposes,
officers will be forced to obtain more warrants, thus increasing the cost and
decreasing the efficiency of law enforcement. Many also argue that in the
wake of September 11, 2001, the government has a greater interest in

134

As the authors of the study point out, the Court has been reluctant to embrace
empirical studies in its opinions. This aside, the point still remains that the Court would at
least be forced to consider what reasonable expectations of privacy might be if the
assumption of risk doctrine were rejected. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 125, at
742–43.
135
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 559 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). For
a convincing argument that people may reasonably expect that digital information is being
reviewed by automated systems, but not by actual human beings or government agents, see
Tokson, supra note 44, at 581.
136
See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Of course the
[Fourth] amendment cannot sensibly be read to mean that police shall be no more efficient in
the twenty-first century than they were in the eighteenth. There is a tradeoff between
security and privacy, and often it favors security.”).
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obtaining personal information.137 While this may be true, this Comment
has attempted to show that the consequences of the assumption of risk
doctrine have resulted in regimes of government investigation that are
broadly invasive and that ignore that changing technology has made it
almost a necessity to expose personal information in the course of everyday
life. 138 Efficient law enforcement is a legitimate and important government
interest, but it must be balanced against competing interests of privacy. 139
While this balancing of interests does require a complicated normative
assessment, the current regime seems to resolve each question in favor of
law enforcement interests at the expense of privacy interests.140 The
discussion of particularity and necessity above attempts to show that the
privacy rights abrogated under current Fourth Amendment doctrine are
fundamental and require more weight in this test.
A similar argument may be made that police officers should not be
required to make difficult decisions on the ground about what activity is
permitted and what activity is not. It is true that the modified Katz test
proposed here, which eliminates the “knowingly exposed” exception, would
redefine some law enforcement actions as searches which previously were
not. This has the potential for engendering uncertainty as law enforcement
agencies struggle to define what is a search under the new test. Simplicity,
though, is not the essential aim of the modified Katz test proposed here—
rather, the principal aim is privacy protection. Moreover, complexity is
nothing new for law enforcement in this area: Fourth Amendment doctrine
is already a notoriously tangled web of exceptions to the warrant
requirement.141 Law enforcement officers will still need to make difficult
decisions about what constitutes a search, but no more than they need to
today.
The activities with which this Comment is concerned, furthermore, are
not the types of activities that require heat-of-the-moment decisions, such as
stops and frisks, vehicle stops, or the appropriate use of force. Data
retention and GPS tracking are methodical surveillance techniques that
require advance planning. Therefore, law enforcement would not be unduly
137

See Solove, supra note 8, at 1097–98.
See supra Part II.B.
139
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 706 (1981) (referring to the “general rule that
the Fourth Amendment . . . perform[s] the constitutional balance between police objectives
and personal privacy”) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
140
See supra Part I.
141
See, e.g., Note, The Fourth Amendment’s Third Way, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1627, 1628
(2007) (referring to the Court’s Fourth Amendment Katz doctrine as a “vast maze”
consisting of “a multitude of exceptions and exemptions” to the warrant requirement and
“doctrinal nooks and crannies”).
138
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hindered by having to acquire a warrant or make difficult decisions before
conducting these types of technology-heavy activities.
2. Future Privacy Erosion and Other Possible Alternatives to Katz
Another criticism of Katz in general is that, by depending in part on an
individual’s subjective expectation of privacy, it allows for the gradual
erosion of those expectations as the government uses more invasive means
of investigation. 142 For example, what if the government took out a
television advertisement during the Super Bowl and announced that it
would begin tapping all phone conversations or that it would read all
personal e-mails? Individuals might then have lost their subjective
expectation of privacy under Katz—even the modified Katz test proposed
here—and those e-mails or phone conversations would no longer be
protected by the Fourth Amendment. Although a comprehensive response
to this general criticism of Katz is somewhat outside the scope of this
Comment, until such drastic action occurs, we have not yet reached the
point where we need to resolve this problem. As I argued in the preceding
Part, there exists today a subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy in
both warrantless GPS tracking and Internet usage data that is circumvented
only by the assumption of risk exception. Absent that loophole, courts
would be forced to consider whether there was a subjective and reasonable
expectation of privacy in those activities and they would likely conclude
that there is. 143
Some commentators, in looking for an immediate answer to future
erosion of privacy, have proposed that Katz be completely discarded. 144
Skok, for instance, proposes that Katz be overturned and advocates instead
for the Court to undertake the normative inquiry it used previously in Smith
v. Maryland. 145 Under this test, the Court would ignore the two-part inquiry
of Katz and ask instead: “should an individual in a free and open society be
forced to assume the risk that the government will monitor her as she
engages in the activity at issue?”146 Skok argues that the Court would
answer this central question by looking to constitutional principles and to
what the Framers intended to protect.147
This test has the benefit of hitching the Fourth Amendment to
something that appears concrete—the original intent of the Framers. This
142

See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“The Katz test . . . has often been
criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.”).
143
See supra Part III.A.
144
See, e.g., Skok, supra note 23, at 82.
145
See id.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 82–83.
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alleviates the concern that as new technology arises, subjective expectations
of privacy will simply be eroded over time. Its drawback, ironically, is this
very detachment from changing expectations of privacy in modern society.
There are privacy questions today that simply do not allow for easy
comparisons to the issues of the colonial era. Modern police forces were
not contemplated in the late eighteenth century. 148 We do not know what
the Framers would have thought of GPS tracking of vehicles. While
personal papers and letters to friends may have been sacred to the
Framers, 149 we do not know how they would have felt about Facebook posts
or Web histories, and there is no way to ask them.
We have a much better idea, however, of how people feel about
modern privacy issues today. If we want more data to determine how
people feel about various invasions of privacy in the modern world, we
have the tools and the opportunity to collect it.150 Retaining the part of Katz
that anchors it to current societal expectations of privacy avoids asking the
Court to make guesses about original intent.
In a response specific to the third-party doctrine, Professor Stephen
Henderson sets forth four factors to consider in determining the expectation
of privacy of a transferor of information to a third party. They are: the
necessity of transferring the information to meaningful participation in
society; the extent to which the information is personal; the extent to which
the information is accessible to nongovernment persons outside of the
transferee; and the extent to which existing law restricts or allows access to
the information. 151 Although this test is rather complex, Henderson notes
that there are few easy answers in the Fourth Amendment/privacy
protection debate. 152
Henderson’s test may be a significant step in the right direction in
terms of the third-party doctrine. Indeed, it overlaps somewhat with the
argument presented here. However, as this Comment has argued, the
underlying problem with the third-party doctrine is the assumption of risk
exception to Katz, which leaves information unprotected even if it is not
exposed to a particular third-party institution. As in the case of GPS
tracking, the information may simply be exposed to the public at large. 153
148

See Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry
v. Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299, 341–46 (2010).
149
See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 641 (1886).
150
See supra Part III.A.
151
See Stephen Henderson, Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance After United
States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 803, 815–17.
152
Id. at 823–24.
153
See supra Part II.A.
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My proposed modified Katz test thus addresses a somewhat broader
concern than does Henderson’s four-factor solution.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that the current controversies over
mandatory data retention and warrantless GPS tracking are symptoms of the
same problem: Katz’s assumption of risk doctrine. It further argued that
changing technology and a static interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
have allowed for a regime in which searches are overbroad both with
respect to people searched and information obtained. The rationale that
information “voluntarily exposed” is no longer private must now be
considered obsolete in an age where exposing some amount of personal
information is necessary to navigate society.
Under a new conception of the two-part Katz test which excludes the
“knowingly exposed” exception to the “reasonable expectation of privacy”
analysis, both mandatory data retention and warrantless GPS tracking
would pose serious constitutional questions—which they should. Katz’s
rigid assumption of risk rule must be changed to keep up with the times.

